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Keeping "The Wild" Out of "The Wild
Blue Yonder": Preventing Terrorist
Attacks Against International Flights in
Civil Aviation
I. Introduction
Terrorist attacks' against international civil aviation2 alarmed
the world in 1985. Hijackers and saboteurs terrorized citizens from a
variety of states. Passengers aboard some of the hijacked aircraft
were held hostage. As air carriers and airports' tightened security
measures for the protection of aircraft, terrorists adjusted their strat-
egy for attracting international publicity by attacking civilians inside
the terminal buildings and airports. Patrons and personnel of air car-
riers were assaulted and time-bombs were exploded in crowded ter-
minals. The international community was outraged.
Undoubtedly, the protection of airport patrons and facilities is
an issue closely related to the issue of aircraft protection. In both
cases, the primary goal is to protect people from terrorist attacks.
However, there is little that states can do to secure airport terminals
which has not been done already. An army of law-enforcement of-
ficers and an anti-terrorist intelligence network are the principal
means by which states attempt to prevent terrorist attacks in termi-
nals. Some countries have also installed screening systems for people
to walk through at terminal entrances.4 The disadvantage of such
screening procedures is that airport patrons are greatly inconve-
nienced by the searches and the ensuing delays.5 Also, a terrorist
could choose to attack airport patrons outside of the terminal en-
trances rather than inside the terminals. Airport-terminal security is
an issue that should be specifically addressed by the international
I. The term "terrorist attacks" is defined as the use of force or weapons, with the
intent of causing great fear among the public, as a method of expressing opposition to the
government of a state. WORLD BOOK DICTIONARY 135, 2148-49 (1973).
2. "International civil aviation" hereinafter will be referred to throughout this com-
ment as "aviation."
3. This comment discusses only those airports which handle international flights on a
daily basis.
4. Survey Finds Security at Airports Usually Serious, Sometimes Not, N.Y. Times,
June 23, 1985, at Al, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Survey].
5. This is especially the case where patrons must line up outside a terminal building
under uncomfortable weather conditions.
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community in the wake of the dual massacres of airport patrons in
Italy and Austria in December 1985.6 This comment, however, only
addresses airport security insofar as it relates to the issue of aircraft
security.
The visibility, mobility and vulnerability of aircraft have made
them a favorite target for terrorists 7 since the late 1960's. The fact
that many air carriers are owned and operated publicly by state gov-
ernments, rather than privately, is one reason why their aircraft have
become extremely powerful symbols open to attack. In addition, an
aircraft in flight, despite all of its engineering sophistication, is a
uniquely fragile vessel once someone aboard is able to exhibit a
weapon or explosive and threaten to use it unless his orders are
obeyed.8 For this reason, there will always be a compelling necessity
to protect the lives of passengers, 9 particularly since the air com-
merce system has become such an essential part of life in the twenti-
eth century.
This comment begins by discussing the ineffectiveness of ex post
facto measures in controlling terrorism. It then describes the preven-
tive - or "pre-attack" - measures which nations and their air car-
riers should take in order to secure aircraft prior to departure. In
this respect, the annexes amending the Convention on International
Civil Aviation 0 will be emphasized insofar as they relate to aviation
security precautions. Finally, the comment focuses upon the methods
by which states can enforce the provisions of the annexes against one
another.
II. The Inadequacy of "Post-Attack" Deterrents
A. Punishment
There have been four conventions that have addressed the sub-
ject of punishing those who commit attacks against aviation. These
6. Airport Terrorists Kill 13 and Wound 113 at Israeli Counters in Rome and Vi-
enna, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
7. Dept. of Transportation Press Release No. 67-85, June 27, 1985 (statement of U.S.
Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole) [hereinafter cited as DOT Press Release No. 67-
85] (available from Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.).
8. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 662, 670 (2d Cir. 1972). This case concerned the
legality of a search and seizure. The defendant, a prospective aircraft passenger, had been
searched after: (I) being selected by a ticket agent as a person to be closely watched because
of suspicious behavior; (2) activating a metal detector; and (3) admitting that he had recently
been released on bail. Id. at 668-69. The airport security officer discovered two fully-packed
brown paper bags in the pockets of the defendant's raincoat which revealed glassine envelopes
filled with narcotics. Id. at 669. The court upheld the legality of the officer's search. Id. at 672-
74.
9. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1972) (court upheld a
search of the defendant's jacket and his person based upon the activation of a metal detector).
10. Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 61
Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 171 U.N.T.S. 345 [hereinafter cited as ICAO Convention].
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conventions are the Geneva Convention of 1958,11 the Tokyo Con-
vention of 1963,12 the Hague Convention of 1970,13 and the Mon-
treal Convention of 1971.14
The Geneva Convention defines the "piracy" of vessels (includ-
ing both ships and aircraft) as an international offense when com-
mitted outside the jurisdiction of any state. The Convention urges
signatory states to cooperate in punishing anyone guilty of such
piracy.15 In the 1950's, hijacking 6 had become a problem in the con-
text of people seeking political asylum." The Geneva Convention
had responded to this problem by discouraging the seizure of aircraft
as a means of escape from one state to another. However, the motive
for hijacking changed in the 1960's, making air piracy an even
greater threat.
Domestic flights within the United States began to be hijacked
to Cuba in 1961 by persons loyal to the Communist regime of Pre-
mier Fidel Castro.18 On many occasions, Cuba refused to return the
hijacked aircraft. 19 In response to such incidents, the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 0 in 1963 sponsored the first
convention to concentrate solely on the subject of attacks against avi-
ation. This convention, known as the Tokyo Convention, 1 permitted
states to establish jurisdiction over any act, including hijacking,
which jeopardized the safety of aviation. The Tokyo Convention
affirmed the punishment principles of the Geneva Convention,23 but
emphasized the necessity for countries to promptly release all hi-
1I. Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. II [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention].
12. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
opened for signature Sept. 14, 1963, 10 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219
(entered into force Dec. 4, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Tokyo Convention].
13. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 0 [hereinafter cited as
Hague Convention].
14. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion, opened for signature Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 0
[hereinafter cited as Montreal Convention].
15. Geneva Convention, supra note 11, at art. 14.
16. This comment will use the popular term "hijacking" to refer to the offense of "air-
craft piracy," as opposed to the piracy of ships. See id. at art. 15. See also 49 U.S.C. §
1472(i) (1982) (criminal penalties for aircraft piracy).
17. See McGinley and Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures - A Reasonable Ap-
proach, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 293, 294 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McGinley & Downs].
18. See Jet Seized, Flown to Cuba, and Released, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1961, at Al,
col. 4; Cuba Releases 37 But Holds Plane, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1961, at Al, col. 5.
19. Cuba Releases 37 But Holds Plane, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1961, at Al, col. 5.
20. The International Civil Aviation Organization is a 156-member specialized agency
of the United Nations formed in 1944 whose activities are aimed at ensuring the safe and
orderly growth of aviation. Dept. of Transportation Press Release No. 118-85, Nov. 6, 1985(available from the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.);
see generally ICAO Convention, supra note 10 (providing for the creation of ICAO).
21. Tokyo Convention, supra note 12.
22. Id. at art. I(b).
23. See Geneva Convention, supra note 11. See also text accompanying notes 15-17.
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jacked aircraft so that air carriers could fulfill their obligation to
carry their passengers to their intended destinations.24 Throughout
the mid-1960's, however, most of the world considered the act of
hijacking to be a problem confined to the Western Hemisphere. 5
The international community began to feel the impact of a new
brand of hijacking in the late 1960's. Terrorist hijackings and violent
attacks against aircraft and aircraft passengers started to become
prevalent by late 1968.6 There had been only forty-three reported
hijackings worldwide from 1960 through 1967, but there were thirty-
five hijackings in 1968 alone. As terrorists began to discover that
their political causes could be publicized worldwide by a sequence of
hijackings, diversions to friendly states and, occasionally, the seizure
of persons aboard the flights as hostages, the frequency of these acts
escalated dramatically. 28 The number of successful hijackings over
the next two years peaked at a staggering rate of almost ninety per
year.29
The climax to this reign of terrorist hijackings occurred during
a tension-packed three-week crisis in 1970 which became known as
"Black September."3 0 A group of terrorists smuggled weapons
aboard five flights out of several European cities and successfully di-
verted four of those flights to states in the Middle East.3 1 The ter-
rorists then held some of the aircraft occupants hostage, blackmailed
several nations into releasing convicted terrorists in exchange for the
hostages and, ultimately, blew up the four aircraft.32 The interna-
tional community reacted to this incident by showing immediate sup-
port for two ICAO conventions sponsored within the following
twelve months. Both were designed to punish such attacks.
The first of these conventions was the Hague Convention, which
was opened for signature in December 1970.33 The Hague Conven-
tion called upon the contracting states to severely punish hijackers in
accordance with the penal codes of their respective governments. 34 A
"universal jurisdiction" provision in the Convention required all sig-
natory states to either prosecute or extradite all apprehended
24. Tokyo Convention, supra note 12, at art. 17.
25. See A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW § 2.21, at 8-35 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter
cited as LOWENFELD].
26. A. EVANS AND J. MURPHY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 7
(1978) [hereinafter cited as EVANS & MURPHY].
27. Id. at 5, 7 (figures from a list compiled by the Federal Aviation Administration's
Civil Aviation Security Service).
28. See id. at 5, 8.
29. See id. at 5.
30. W. POLK, THE ARAB WORLD 246 (4th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as POLK].
31. 4 Jets Hijacked; One, a 747, Is Blown Up, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1970, at 1, col. 4
[hereinafter cited as 4 Jets Hijacked].
32. See McGinley & Downs, supra note 17, at 298.
33. Hague Convention, supra note 13.
34. Id. at art. 2.
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hijackers.3 5
In addition, the second ICAO-sponsored convention, the Mon-
treal Convention of 1971,6 expanded the scope of offenses subject to
the penal provisions of the Hague Convention to include: the com-
mission of violent acts against persons on board an aircraft, sabo-
tage, and the communication of false information which threatens
the safety of an aircraft. 7
Although the ICAO-sponsored aviation security conventions are
among the most widely-accepted instruments in international law,
38
the unfortunate reality is that many terrorists do not fear punish-
ment or death.39 Furthermore, the imprisonment and killing of ter-
rorists has the tendency to perpetuate a cycle of further attacks
against aviation for the purpose of either blackmailing a state into
releasing imprisoned colleagues' or avenging the slaying of a col-
league during an earlier attack. International agreements to punish
or extradite attackers against aviation have effectively deterred those
persons who used to hijack aircraft for non-terrorist motives." How-
ever, the wave of attacks against aviation in 1985 shows that ter-
rorists are willing to risk penal consequences in order to publicize
their causes to the world.
B. Sanctions Against States That Do Not Punish
It has been said that states have a duty to exercise "due dili-
gence" in preventing the use of their territories as bases for ter-
rorists.42 The Consultative Assembly to the Council of Europe, in the
midst of the "Black September" crisis,'43 resolved that its members
would take sanctions 4 against any countries that become "accom-
35. Id. at art. 7.
36. Montreal Convention, supra note 14.
37. See id. at art. 1.
38. The Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions each have more than 125 signatory
states. U.S. Will End Curbside Check-ins As Part of Drive on Airline Terror, N.Y. Times,
June 28, 1985, at Al, col. 4 (statement by Assad Kotaite, President of ICAO Security Coun-
cil). See also ICAO Assembly, 24th Sess. (A24-Min., P/I-15) 94, 95 Doc. 9415 (Sept. 20-
Oct. 7, 1983).
39. See, e.g., Terrorist Goal Was Hostages, Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 31, 1985, at I-
A, col. 6 (terrorists "sworn to die").
40. See E. MCWHINNEY, THE ILLEGAL DIVERSION OF AIRCRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 114 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MCWHINNEY].
41. Id. at I. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 17 (regarding persons seeking
political asylum). See also LOWENFELD, supra note 25, § 2.32, at 8-46 n.(g) (regarding a
series of hijackings occurring aboard domestic United States flights between November 1971
and February 1972 for the purpose of robbing the passengers).
42. Lillich and Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Ter-
rorist Activities, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 217, 276 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Lillich and Paxman].
43. See supra text accompanying note 26.
44. A "sanction" is a punitive act taken by one nation against another nation which has
violated a treaty or international law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1203 (5th ed. 1979).
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plices to these criminal acts."'4 5 The use of an aviation boycott as a
sanction was also one of the issues debated at the meetings of the
member nations of the ICAO during the early 1970's.
In the ICAO Assembly, the sanctions issue was a delicate one,
since such drastic measures could do serious harm to existing rela-
tions between countries. Nevertheless, several states in the ICAO
Assembly adamantly pressed for the adoption of a convention that
would enforce the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions by re-
quiring a boycott of any nation that failed to adhere to those conven-
tions.4 6 Several other countries, however, believed that an ICAO-
sponsored sanctions convention would be tantamount to a usurpation
of the sanctioning power ordinarily reserved to the United Nations
Security Council.17 On two occasions in 1973, proposals to draft a
sanctions convention failed to achieve the requisite two-thirds major-
ity in the ICAO Assembly, and so the proposal was unable to pass as
a resolution.' 8
One problem with the use of sanctions is that it is sometimes
difficult to prove that a state has breached its international legal
duty to prevent the use of its territories as a base for terrorists."9 For
example, terrorists may operate within a country due to their popu-
larity and military strength on the local level, although the govern-
ment of that country may wish that it had the capability to drive
them out. 0 Another problem is that even the most extreme terrorists
have their sympathizers.51 In addition, some nations simply do not
45. Resolution 450 on Air Piracy, Eur. Consult. Ass., 10th Sess. Doc. - (1970)
(reprinted in E. MCWHINNEY, AERIAL PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 194 (1971)). The
Council of Europe is an organization which includes most of the non-Soviet bloc European
nations. Based in Strasbourg, France, the Council was formed in 1949
• . . to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safe-
guarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heri-
tage and facilitating their economic and social progress . . . . This aim will be
pursued through the organs of the Council by discussion of questions of common
concern and by agreements and common action in . . . legal . . . matters ....
0. CRAWFORD, DONE THIS DAY 24 (1969) (excerpt from the chartering convention of the
Council). The Council is composed of a Committee of Ministers and a Consultative Assembly.
The Committee of Ministers aims to develop cooperation between the governments of the
member states. The Consultative Assembly provides "a means through which the aspirations
of the European peoples may be formulated and expressed, the governments thus being kept
continually in touch with European public opinion." Id. at 25 (excerpt from the chartering
convention).
46. See FitzGerald, Unlawful Interference With Civil Aviation, reprinted in ESSAYS IN
AIR LAW 64 (A. Kean ed. 1982); see also MCWHINNEY, supra note 40, at !15 (France, Great
Britain and Switzerland were some of the states that sponsored such proposals).
47. See FitzGerald, supra note 46, at 64.
48. Id. at 64-65. See also MCWHINNEY, supra note 40, at 115.
49. Lillich and Paxman, supra note 42, at 276.
50. Jordan was unable to expel the terrorists who had hijacked three aircraft to that
state during "Black September." See, e.g., POLK, supra note 30, at 246. Also, Lebanon was
unable to expel the terrorist group believed to be responsible for the destruction of American
and French military compounds in October 1983. See generally Marines Release Diagram On
Blast, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
51. Trskman, The Finnish-Soviet Hijacking Treaty, 26 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN
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want commercial air relations with certain other nations. Sanctions
do not affect hostile countries which fervently support causes es-
poused by terrorists. Under these circumstances, sanctions cannot be
expected to reduce the frequency of attacks against aviation.
C. Air Police
The presence of law-enforcement officers aboard flights could be
regarded as a preventive, rather than an ex post facto, deterrent in
the case of non-terrorist hijackers. Non-terrorists would be more apt
to think twice about carrying out their plans to either flee a state or
rob passengers 2 when an officer in uniform is aboard their flight. It
is now common for air police to travel incognito as passengers or
airline employees.53 The placement of these disguised officers aboard
select flights can also deter potential hijackers who are less willing
than terrorists to take the chance that their flight may or may not
have police on board. For terrorists, however, since their philosophy
often requires them to accept the possibility of death as a necessary
risk in furthering their cause, they are more likely to accept any
challenge which an air police officer may present. It is therefore
more appropriate to categorize the use of air police as merely an-
other type of "after-the-fact" deterrent with regard to terrorist
hijackers.
The idea of air police first became popular during the "Black
September" crisis."4 An armed officer aboard one of the five hijacked
aircraft thwarted the hijack by fatally shooting the lone terrorist
gunman.5 5 The heroics of that officer led the international commu-
nity to believe that the presence of air police could remedy the hi-
jacking problem. The Council of Europe urged its members to con-
sider placing officers aboard international flights 6 and the United
States ordered that "sky marshals" be placed aboard a significant
number of American air carriers operating flights to Europe and the
Middle East.5 7
LAW 243, 246 (1982).
52. See supra note 41.
53. For example, Israel's air carrier carries up to ten disguised officers per flight. See
LOWENFELD, supra note 25, § 2.31, at 8-44; Making the Sky Secure, TIME, July 1, 1985, at
21 [hereinafter cited as Making the Sky Secure]. Egypt's air carrier carries up to four dis-
guised officers per flight. See Attack Was 'Our Only Hope,' Pilot of Flight 648 Declares, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 25, 1985, at Al, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as Attack Was 'Our Only Hope].
54. See 4 Jets Hijacked, supra note 31 and accompanying text, at 1, col. 4. See also
supra text accompanying note 30.
55. A female terrorist, holding grenades, was quickly overpowered by other persons on
board the flight soon after the male terrorist was killed. 4 Jets Hijacked, supra note 31, at 1,
col. 4.
56. Recommendation 613 on Air Safety and Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Eur. Con-
sult. Ass., 18th Sess. Doc. No. - (1970).
57. See Transportation of Federal Air Marshals - Background, 50 Fed. Reg. 27,924
(1985).
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The United States quietly discontinued the "sky marshal" pro-
gram shortly after its implementation because the use of air police in
large numbers came to be considered unnecessary.58 Government of-
ficials had stated that there was no direct evidence that air police
actually prevented hijackings. 59 The hijacking of an American air-
craft in June 1985, however, prompted the United States to reestab-
lish an air police program very similar to the one which had been
deployed fifteen years earlier."0 In the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985,1 Congress specifically au-
thorized the executive branch of the Government to carry out the air
police program.62
Several problems make the placement of air police aboard air-
craft a very risky measure. One of these is the general fearlessness of
most terrorists. Three other problems became evident during the ter-
rorist hijacking of an Egyptian aircraft in November 1985. First, the
terrorists were probably aware of the fact that several officers usu-
ally were carried aboard each of the flights of that particular air
carrier. 63 It was probably for this reason that, soon after the three
terrorists commandeered the flight, one of them began to frisk the
passengers for weapons.64 When one of the disguised officers was or-
dered to submit to a frisk, the officer felt compelled to confront the
terrorists rather than risk their reaction if they were to discover his
weapon and his identity. 5
The ensuing gunfight could have killed passengers caught in the
crossfire, a second problem to having armed officers on board
flights. 6 The officer did kill the terrorist who was nearest to him, but
the other two terrorists wounded the officer with shots from the front
and rear of the aircraft cabin. 67 The third problem occurred when
58. Id.
59. Terrorist Hijack Spurs U.S. Review of Int'l Security, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., June 24, 1985, at 30, 32 [hereinafter cited as Terrorist Hijack Spurs U.S.].
60. 50 Fed. Reg. 27,924 (1985) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 108.14).
61. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
83, 99 Stat. 190 [hereinafter cited as 1985 Act].
62. Id. at § 553(a), 99 Stat. 190, 226 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. [[ 1356b).
63. According to passengers, the terrorists began to collect passports and check passen-
gers for firearms about one hour after the hijacking had begun. Attack was 'Our Only Hope',
supra note 53.
There were four "security policemen" aboard the hijacked Egyptian aircraft. List of Pas-
sengers and Crew Members on Egyptian Plane, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1985, at A13, col. I.
64. Attack Was 'Our Only Hope', supra note 53.
65. Id.
66. Id. See also MCWHINNEY, supra note 40, at 87 (one passenger killed when F.B.I.
officers thwarted an attempted hijack of a domestic American flight to the Soviet Union in the
early 1970's); LOWENFELD, supra note 25, § 2.31, at 8-44 (six passengers wounded when Is-
raeli officers thwarted an attempted hijack of an Israeli flight in February 1969).
67. Shot in Head or Caught in Inferno, Passengers Live to Tell of Ordeal, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 26, 1985, at Al, col. 4.
According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA) of international air car-
riers, most airlines now believe that the posting of disguised air police aboard flights may
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one of the stray bullets punctured the fuselage of the aircraft. 8 The
consequent depressurization of the cabin created turbulence through-
out the duration of the flight.6 9 This combination of risk to passen-
gers involving stray bullets and transport in a damage aircraft has
led security experts to agree that the "best place to head off hijack-
ings is on the ground."7
Il. Prevention: "Pre-Attack" Deterrence
A. The Duty of Air Carriers to Secure Their Flights
The Warsaw Convention of 19291 established the liability of
air carriers to their passengers for "accidents" occurring during a
flight and "in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking" from a flight.72 However, the Warsaw Convention ex-
cused an air carrier from liability if it was proven that "all necessary
measures" had been taken to avoid the accident or that it had been
impossible to take such measures. 3 Most air carriers agreed to a
waiver of this defense for various policy reasons in the Montreal
Agreement of 1966. 7' For example, they agreed that they were best
qualified to develop preventive security measures for controlling ac-
cess to aircraft, most capable of assessing and insuring against avia-
tion risks, and most capable of distributing the costs of prevention.75
One of the first cases in which passengers upon a hijacked air-
craft recovered damages under the Warsaw Convention was Husserl
v. Swiss Air Transport.7 ' The plaintiff, in an action which arose out
of the "Black September" incident of 1970, alleged bodily and
provoke, rather than prevent, violence.
In reference to the November 1985 hijacking and subsequent mid-air shoot out, an IATA
spokesman noted that, "[t]he unfortunate way this incident turned out simply reinforced the
general view that sky marshals are not a significant deterrent, and may even contribute to a
situation deteriorating . . . [Miost airlines feel that firearms on board contribute to the prob-
lem." Airlines Doubtful on Guards, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1985, at A12, col. 1.
68. From Takeoff to Raid: The 24 Hours of Flight 648, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1985,
at AI0, col. I.
69. Id.; see also A 'Gentle' Man Began the Terror, Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 26,
1985, at 13A, col. I.
70. Sky-Marshal Plan Draws Criticism, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1985, at A20, col. 1.
This view is particularly favored by the IATA, the 137-member organization of representatives
from states' air carrier industries- Id.
71. Convention for the Unification of Certain Air Transportation Rules, opened for
signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. II [hereinafter cited as
Warsaw Convention].
72. Id. at art. 17.
73. Id. at art. 20.
74. The Agreement consisted of several documents which were agreed upon by the
United States and the IATA. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 703 n.l.
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), affid 485 F.2d 1240 (2nd Cir. 1973). (The Montreal Agreement of 1966 is
different from the Montreal Convention of 1971 previously mentioned at note 14 and accom-
panying text).
75. Id. at 707.
76. Id. at 702.
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mental harm due to the hijacking of the aircraft on which she was a
passenger. 7 In 1972, the district court denied the defendant air car-
rier's motions for dismissal of the complaint and for summary judg-
ment.7 8 The Court held that the term "accident," as used in both the
Warsaw Convention and the supplementary Montreal Agreement,
encompassed hijackings. 79 Therefore, proof of the fact that the air-
craft was hijacked was sufficient to raise a presumption of the air
carrier's liability under those documents.8"
In 1977, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled upon the is-
sue of what constitutes an "embarking" under the Warsaw Conven-
tion. The plaintiffs in Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines81 had
been instructed by airline officials to line up in the departure lounge
for a routine security screening prior to boarding their scheduled
flight.82 As passengers began to filter through the screening check-
point, terrorists assaulted the plaintiffs and other passengers who
were awaiting security clearance in the lounge.83 The court consid-
ered three factors: the location of the accident, the activity of the
plaintiffs at the time of the accident and the air carrier's assumption
of control over the plaintiffs at that location and time.84 The court
held that the air carrier's order for the passengers to line up in prep-
aration for boarding occurred during one of the "operations of em-
barking" and, therefore, fell within the sphere of liability under the
Warsaw Convention.8 5 The Husserl and Evangelinos cases illustrate
the legal duties which air carriers owe to their passengers to ensure
that hijackers and saboteurs do not succeed in putting either weap-
ons or explosives aboard aircraft flights.
B. Safeguarding the Aircraft Cabin
1. The Screening of Passengers.-A procedure for the screening of
passengers prior to air flight departures was not developed until the
frequency of hijackings began to climb in 1968.86 In October 1968,
77. Id. at 703.
78. Id. at 708.
79. Id. at 707; cf. National Airlines v. Edwards, 336 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1976) (damages
allegedly incurred due to injuries caused by consumption of Cuban food and beverages during
hijack to Cuba held to be too remote from hijacking to be recoverable under the Warsaw
Convention and Montreal Agreement).
80. 351 F. Supp. at 703.
81. 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977).
82. Id. at 154 n.6.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 156.
85. Id. Accord Day v. Trans World Airlines, 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affid
528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975). In this case, arising from the same terrorist attack involved in
Evangelinos, the district court reached the same conclusion that the Warsaw Convention ap-
plied (see supra text accompanying note 79), but held that the "activity" of the plaintiffs at
the time of attack was the controlling factor.
86. See EVANS & MURPHY, supra note 26, at 5. See also supra text accompanying
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the United States Government appointed a task force to devise a
system that could detect potential hijackers without requiring a com-
plete search of every prospective passenger.87 The task force recom-
mended the use of two procedures: personality analysis and metal
detection .88
The personality analysis, or "hijacker profile," was compiled by
a team of psychologists, sociologists, scientists and federal investiga-
tors.89 It consists of about twenty-five behavioral traits that prior hi-
jackers tended to exhibit.90 The procedure calls for the airline em-
ployee at the ticket counter to observe prospective passengers for any
unusual behavior listed on the "profile." 91 The employee will then
either place a secret mark on that person's boarding pass or notify a
security officer at the departure gate that the person should be ob-
served closely. 92 In either situation, the selected person may be asked
to produce positive identification upon arriving at the security check-
point of the departure gate.9" The "profile" remains an element of
preliminary screening of prospective passengers at many airports.9'
However, the metal detector has been the primary method for
screening persons for weapons since 1973, when it became
mandatory at departure gates in all United States airports.95
note 27.
87. LOWENFELD, supra note 25, § 2.32, at 8-45.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972) (a match of defend-
ant to the "hijacker profile," his failure to clear the metal detection checkpoint at the boarding
gate, and his failure to produce positive identification upon request by a federal marshal were
held to constitute a sufficient security threat to enable the marshal to lead defendant to a
private security area, pat him down, and search his baggage for weapons); see also Dailey,
Development of a Behavioral Profile for Air Pirates, 18 VILL. L. REV. 1004 (1973) (Dr. Dai-
ley, a psychologist, was a member of the task force referred to in the text accompanying notes
81-83) [hereinafter cited as Dailey].
91. See LOWENFELD, supra note 25, § 2.32, at 8-45. The contents of the "profile" is
kept confidential for security reasons by the Federal Government since potential hijackers
could seriously undermine the system by adopting a demeanor acceptable under the "profile."
See also United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). In Lopez, the manage-
ment of an American air carrier issued a memorandum, without any authorization, to its
boarding area personnel. The memorandum purported to "update" the "profile" by eliminating
one of the fundamental characteristics of hijackers, as described by Dr. Dailey during in cam-
era testimony, and adding two elements: passenger ethnicity and discretion by the airline em-
ployee. 328 F. Supp. at I 101; see generally Dailey, supra note 90 (concerning the expertise of
Dr. Dailey on the "profile"). The effect of the changes was to destroy the essential neutrality
and objectivity of the "profile." 328 F. Supp. at 1101. The district court granted the defend-
ant's motion to suppress the narcotics evidence that was seized during the airport search of the
defendant by federal marshals pursuant to the tainted security procedures. 328 F. Supp. at
1102.
92. See LOWENFELD, supra note 25, § 2.32 at 8-45, 8-46; United States v. Slocum, 464
F.2d at 1182.
93. See LOWENFELD, supra note 25, § 2.32, at 8-46; 464 F.2d at 1182.
94. Terrorist Hijack Spurs U.S. Review supra note 59, at 32.
95. Dept. of Transportation Press Release No. 103-72, Dec. 5, 1972 (mandating the
use of full passenger screening by Jan. 5, 1973) [hereinafter cited as DOT Press Release No.
103-72] (reprinted in United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 902 n.25 (9th Cir. 1973) (seizure
Spring 19861
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The metal detector is a device which is typically attached to two
upright poles through which prospective passengers walk.9 The de-
vice registers a positive reading whenever a person is carrying an
amount of ferrous metal equivalent to that contained in a* small
handgun.97 If a person was selected as a potential hijacker by the
ticket-counter employee, then he might be asked to submit to a frisk
if the device registers a positive reading. 98 On the other hand, per-
sons who do not meet the profile criteria but register a positive read-
ing on the metal detector are asked to voluntarily place their metal-
lic items on the security counter and walk through a second time.99
Security provisions within the annexes to the ICAO Convention
have endorsed the screening of prospective passengers. Annex 17 re-
quires contracting states to take "the necessary measures" to prevent
the unauthorized introduction of weapons and devised aboard air-
craft.100 Furthermore, Annex 9 specifically recommends that such
states, "to the extent feasible, utilize security equipment" so as to
materially reduce the number of persons to be searched by other
means.10 1 The worldwide adoption of metal detectors for use in na-
tional aviation security programs has facilitated the prompt depar-
ture of flights by keeping security delays to a minimum.
2. The Screening of Baggage.-The pre-flight screening of
carry-on baggage 0 2 became mandatory in the United States by 1973
as a necessary complement to the simultaneous mandate of metal
detectors at departure gates in American airports.103 The importance
of screening baggage prior to departures became especially evident
following the massacre of airport patrons by terrorists in an Israeli
airport in May 1972.104 The terrorists had hidden machine-guns in
of defendant's briefcase for routine security check by airline employee in departure lounge
held to be an unconstitutional search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment where defend-
ant had no opportunity to offer his consent.)).
96. United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d at 1182. This comment will use the popular
term "metal detector" in place of the industry term "magnetometer."
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. ICAO Convention, Annex 17, para. 4.1.5, reprinted in ICAO News Release, Inter-
national Standards and Recommended Practices - Security - Safeguarding International
Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference (2d ed. Oct. 1981).
101. ICAO Convention, Annex 9 (Facilitation), para. 6.15, reprinted in ICAO News
Release, supra note 100, at Attachments app. Annex 17 reproduces the full text of all aviation
security specifications which are contained in the other annexes to the ICAO Convention.
Kotaite, Security of Int'l Civil Aviation - Role of ICAO, 7 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE LAW
95, 98 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Kotaite].
102. For purposes of this comment, "baggage" will refer to any personal belongings that
a passenger elects to bring into the aircraft cabin. Compare infra note I 11.
103. DOT Press Release No. 103-72, supra note 95.
104. 25 Die at Israeli Airport as 3 Gunmen From Plane Fire on 250 in a Terminal,
N.Y. Times, May 31, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
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their baggage prior to boarding a flight for Israel. 0 5 Although the
attack occurred after their arrival, it was plainly recognized that the
weapons could have been used to hijack the aircraft instead.
The ICAO Convention's annexes provide for the screening of
baggage in the same manner in which they provide for the screening
of passengers.106 Baggage searches are usually 0 7 conducted either
physically or through the use of X-rays. Annex 9 to the ICAO Con-
vention recommends the use of "security equipment," such as X-ray
devices, in order to reduce the delay inherent in physical searches. 08
However, certain tactics, such as the encasement of weapons with
foil, have been used successfully to distort or hide the shape of an
image on an X-ray screen.'09 Consequently, aviation officials in sev-
eral states have recommended that at least ten percent of all bag-
gage be physically searched." 0
C. Safeguarding the Aircraft Cargo-Bay
On June 23, 1985, a bomb exploded in the cargo-bay of a Cana-
dian aircraft as luggage"' was being unloaded by airport personnel
upon arrival at an airport in Japan." 2 Although two airport workers
were killed and four others injured by the blast, the bomb easily
could have exploded while the aircraft was in flight over the Pacific
Ocean had it not been for the arrival of the aircraft fifteen minutes
ahead of schedule.'13 Less than an hour later, a bomb exploded
aboard an Indian aircraft in flight over the North Atlantic Ocean
near Ireland, '4 killing all 329 persons on board." 5 The June 23 ex-
105. Id.
106. ICAO Convention, Annex 17, para. 4.1.5., supra note 100.
107. For a discussion of the limits on the use of searches concerning diplomats' baggage,
see E. DENZA. DIPLOMATIC LAW 127 (1976).
108. ICAO Convention, Annex 9 (Facilitation) para. 6.16, supra note 101.
109. Making the Sky Secure, supra note 53, at 21.
110. See, e.g., Greeks Claim Athens Needs No Security Upgrade, AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH, June 24, 1985, at 30 (position of European Civil Aviation Conference); DOT
Press Release No. 67-85, supra note 7. For a discussion of the constitutional issues surround-
ing airport security searches, see generally United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (uphold-
ing their constitutionality). But see McGinley, supra note 17 (disputing the constitutionality of
such searches).
Ill. For purposes of this comment, "luggage" will refer to any personal belongings
which a passenger elects to "check" into the cargo-bay of an aircraft. Compare supra note
102.
112. lyer, Two More Strikes for Terrorists?, TIME, July 1, 1985, at 36 [hereinafter
cited as Iyer].
113. Id.
114. Id. The circumstantial evidence eventually led most aviation experts to conclude
that an explosion, rather than a structural defect in the aircraft, was the cause of the Air India
accident. This evidence included the facts that the Indian and Canadian aircraft had both
departed from Vancouver, Canada earlier that day, the Indian aircraft had disappeared sud-
denly from the radar-screen which had been tracking it and the wreckage had been scattered.
Id. See also Mounties Hold 2 in Jet Blast, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1985, at A3, col. 1.
115. lyer, supra note 112.
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plosions were believed to be related since both aircraft had departed
from the Canadian city of Vancouver earlier that day." 6 This double
sabotage led to the implementation of a number of new security reg-
ulations at airports for the purpose of safeguarding aircraft cargo-
bays from the work of saboteurs. These newly adopted methods in-
cluded the matching of passengers with their luggage and the screen-
ing of luggage and cargo.
1. Matching Passengers With Their Luggage.-Annex 17 to
the ICAO Convention recommends that airports set aside secure
storage areas where "unidentified" luggage may be held until it is
claimed." 7 This provision implicitly recognizes that unidentified suit-
cases, in any part of an airport, may be laden with time-bombs and
so must be confiscated promptly. In September 1985, the ICAO
Council proposed a new standard which was adopted by the ICAO
Assembly on December 19, 1985.118 This new standard requires con-
tracting states to establish measures for matching passengers with
their luggage prior to departure. The underlying assumption is that a
saboteur would not want to be one of his own victims by willingly
boarding a flight upon which he has placed explosives.
A less time-consuming measure for achieving the same anti-sab-
otage goal would be to ensure that luggage is checked in for a flight
only by ticketed passengers at the air carrier's ticket counter." 9
Prior to the June 1985 double sabotage, a saboteur could check
bomb-laden luggage into the cargo-bay of an aircraft at many air-
ports worldwide with little difficulty. 20 One could drive up to the
entrance to a terminal, request and tip an airport worker to have
luggage checked aboard a flight, and drive away. In response to this
scenario, the United States eliminated curbside check-ins for
flights '2 and declared that luggage would only be accepted at ticket
counters from ticketed passengers with positive identification.' 22 An
air carrier can empty an aircraft prior to departure and match pas-
sengers to their luggage if there is a discrepancy between the num-
ber of persons who checked in for a flight and the number who actu-
116. See supra note 114.
117. ICAO Convention, Annex 17, para. 4.1.15, supra note 100.
118. ICAO Convention, Annex 17, Amendment 6, para. 5.1.4 adopted Dec. 19, 1985, to
become effective Oct. 19, 1987, to become applicable on Dec. 19, 1987. Telephone interview
with John Marrett, Chief of Aviation Security Section, ICAO, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
(February 27, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Telephone Interview with John Marrett]. See also
ICAO News Release No. 13-85, Sept. 1985.
119. See DOT Press Release No. 65-85, supra note 7.
120. See Reagan to Get Transportation Dept. s Proposals Today On Aviation Security,
N.Y. Times, June 25, 1985, at A9, col. I (city ed.).
121. DOT Press Release No. 67-85, supra note 7.
122. Id.
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ally board.' Different preventive measures are needed, however, if
an air carrier is to prevent a terrorist saboteur who is willing to blow
himself up along with the aircraft.
2. The Screening of Luggage and Cargo.-Ideally, the most
effective way to thwart a suicidal saboteur is to screen every piece of
luggage and cargo that is to be shipped while it is en route to the
cargo-bay of the aircraft. 124 Some states screen all luggage and
cargo by using X-ray devices, physical searches or dogs trained to
detect explosives.' 25 However, aviation experts admit that most air
carriers do not want to inspect all luggage and cargo because it
would mean that at some of the busier airports in the world passen-
gers would have to arrive up to six hours prior to departure to allow
for inspection of the large volume of items to be carried by the air-
craft. 1 26 Consequently, states that have a comparatively heavy vol-
ume of flights often maintain a selective screening system for lug-
gage and require that cargo either be held for at least twenty-four
hours or be screened if it is to be shipped aboard a passenger
flight. 12 7 In addition, several technological innovations in the field of
explosives-detection have either been implemented already or remain
a few years away from success.
1 28
D. Safeguarding the Entire Aircraft
As screening techniques have become more sophisticated, ter-
rorists have become less willing to risk detection by personally at-
123. See Making the Sky Secure, supra note 53.
124. Marbach, Cooke, Foote and Colton, Building the Terror-Proof Airport, 106
NEWSWEEK, July 8, 1985, at 36 [hereinafter cited as Marbach].
125. Israel routinely searches luggage physically and uses an X-ray device for screening
cargo. See LOWENFELD, supra note 21, § 2.31, at 8-44; Jumbo-Jet Crash Might Be a First,
N.Y. Times, June 24, 1985, at All, col.3. After the June 23, 1985 double sabotage, India
announced plans to use X-ray devices and specially trained dogs when screening luggage. See
India Acts to Stem Airline Terrorism, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1985, at A14, col. I (city ed.);
Skrzycki, Can We Secure the World's Skies?, 99 U.S. NEW & WORLD REP., July 8, 1985, at
3 [hereinafter cited as Skrzycki]. Canada announced that luggage would undergo either a
physical or X-ray screening at its airports due to the double sabotage. See DOT Press Release
No. 67-85, supra note 7.
126. See Skrzycki, supra note 125, at 32.
127. See DOT Press Release No. 67-85, supra note 7. Both the United States and Ca-
nada provide screening exemptions for perishable cargo items accepted for transport from
known shippers. Id.
128. These innovations include: (I) the use of a mass spectrograph machine to analyze
the air inside shipping containers; (2) the use of gamma-ray or high-intensity X-ray machines
in order to enhance the imaging of containers' contents and to allow personnel to compare
images to those stored in the computer; (3) the subjecting of items to air-pressure changes in
order to defuse air-pressure fuses; (4) the use of nuclear magnetic resonance; (5) the use of
"thermal neutron activation" radiation bombardment; and (6) a sniffer built into an aircraft's
pressurization system that would warn a pilot of on-board explosives while the aircraft is taxy-
ing. See Marbach, supra note 124, at 37; see also 1985 Act, § 557, 99 Stat. 190, 227 (appro-
priating over $5 million for research on techniques for detecting explosives).
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tempting to smuggle weapons aboard aircraft. 29 For example, five
screening checks were used at the airport in Greece prior to the June
1985 hijack of an American aircraft and the November 1985 hijack
of an Egyptian aircraft, both of which departed from that airport."' 0
Indeed, only weeks before the November hijacking, aviation experts
had described that airport as probably one of the world's best-
guarded terminals."' 1 Thus, it became increasingly likely that the
terrorist hijackers had accomplices who worked for either the airport
in Greece or the airport in Egypt. 132
1. The Screening of Airport Personnel.-Annex 17 to the
ICAO Convention, in a broadly-worded recommendation, urges con-
tracting states to take necessary measures to prevent weapons and
devices from being introduced aboard any "aircraft not engaged in
the carriage of passengers."' 1 3 Such aircraft would include those
standing on the tarmac at an airport during a stopover between
flights. Since the labor turnover at many airports can be as high as
two hundred percent annually and background checks on new per-
sonnel may not be conducted thoroughly,3 " it is essential that air-
port personnel be subject to some sort of screening prior to gaining
access to the airport tarmac to perform their duties.
Following the November 1985 hijack of the Egyptian aircraft,
the International Air Transport Association (IATA) of air carriers
suggested that boarding ramps be classified as "sterile" areas.1 35
This preventive measure would require that all catering, cleaning
and other personnel at airports be searched by some method in order
to guard against the possibility that they might secretly hide weap-
ons aboard aircraft for the later recovery and usage by the actual
129. See Making the Sky Secure, supra note 53.
130. Airport Security Tight. Greeks Say, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1985, at A13, col. 1.
[hereinafter cited as Airport Security Tight].
131. Id. Contrast this extremely supportive description of the airport security in Greece
during the fall of 1985 with the extremely critical descriptions of the airport security in Greece
during the first six months of 1985. See infra notes 174-180 and accompanying text.
132. See id. See also Making the Sky Secure, supra note 53.
133. ICAO Convention, Annex 17, para. 4.1.5.1, supra note 101.
134. See CBS's Sixty Minutes television program, Airport, produced by B. Lando, re-
ported by M. Wallace, Dec. I, 1985 (expos6 of two major American airports).
135. IA TA Experts Focus on Airport Ramp Security, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH,
Dec. 2, 1985, at 31 [hereinafter cited as IATA Experts]. Classification of an airport section as
a "sterile" area requires that there be "no possibility of mixing or contact between controlled
passengers and uncontrolled persons after the security control gates of an airport have been
passed prior to embarkation." ICAO Convention, Annex 17, para. 4.1.13, supra note 100. In
the "sterile" area, "crew or passengers in direct transit on the same aircraft, or transferring to
other flights, may remain temporarily without being subject to inspection formalities." ICAO
Convention, Annex 9 (Facilitation), para. 6.27, supra note 101. It has been said that "the
sanitized areas should be ones in which once you are in it, you can't get out . . . [ylou
shouldn't be able to go backwards or sideways - only straight into the aircraft." See
Marbach, supra note 124, at 36 (statement of British Army Maj. Gen. R. Clutterbuck).
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hijackers.1 36 Furthermore, IATA recommends that screened person-
nel be required to wear positive identification while on duty which
can be readily verified by airline and airport security personnel.1 37
As a secondary precaution, the annexes to the ICAO Conven-
tion provide for a security inspection of aircraft by an airline em-
ployee if any threat against that aircraft has been made. Annex 6
requires that all aircraft contain a checklist of the procedures to be
followed in searching for a bomb.' 3 8 Also, Annex 17 recommends
that the entire aircraft be inspected if it is believed to be the likely
"object of an act of unlawful interference."' 39 Annex 17 further rec-
ommends that air carriers take precautions to prevent unauthorized
access to unattended aircraft, such as locking aircraft doors and re-
moving loading stairs." 0 While it is important that air carriers take
precautions to ensure that airport personnel are screened, the an-
nexes also express the necessity for airport security to cooperate by
patrolling the tarmac and the surrounding perimeter of the airport in
order to fully secure all aircraft."'
2. Guarding the Tarmac.-In February 1974, a man fatally
shot a policeman stationed beside the metal detector at a departure
gate in an American airport, ran up a ramp and into an aircraft, and
attempted a hijacking."" To avoid such incidents, many air carriers
now provide buses for the transport of their passengers from the de-
parture gate to the area of the tarmac where their aircraft await
boarding."43 Israel's national air carrier routinely parks its aircraft
far from terminal buildings so that nobody can approach unno-
ticed.14 ' Annex 17 of the ICAO Convention directs airports to pro-
vide for "maximum segregation and special guarding of aircraft
which are liable to be attacked" during stopovers.145 Parking at a
distance can be of great assistance to airport security personnel by
giving them more time to respond to encroachments toward an air-
craft by unauthorized persons.
In the spring of 1985, attacks against three aircraft illustrated
136. IATA Experts, supra note 135, at 31.
137. IATA Recommended Minimum Security Procedures for Implementation at Inter-
national Airports, approved by the Executive Comm. (109th mtg.) (May 14-15, 1979) (herein-
after cited as IATA Recommended Procedures] reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW
- DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 1167 (2d ed. 1981).
138. ICAO Convention, Annex 6 (Operation of Aircraft), para. 13.2, supra note 101.
139. ICAO Convention, Annex 17, para. 4.1.17, supra note 100.
140. Id. at para. 4.1.10.
141. See infra notes 145 and 149-51.
142. Hijacker Kills 2 and Then Himself, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1974, at Al, col. 1.
143. See Survey, supra note 4.
144. Trimble, Aboard Israel's 'Flying Fortress', U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 8,
1985, at 32.
145. ICAO Convention, Annex 17, para. 4.1.9, supra note 100.
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the necessity of a well-patrolled tarmac. At the airport in Athens,
Greece, a man found an opening in the fencing, crept toward the
tarmac, fired a small rocket at a taxying aircraft and fled.14 One
month later, a man at an American airport disabled two parked air-
craft, including one with passengers aboard, with gunshots. 147 One
month after that, six men drove onto the tarmac at the airport in
Lebanon, fired shots at security officers, stormed aboard an aircraft
and hijacked it.' 8 There are several precautions which the interna-
tional community has recommended for the prevention of such
incidents.
The installation of fencing and security lighting at airports are
among the recommended practices enumerated in Annex 14 to the
ICAO Convention as deterrents against trespassers. 14 9 Annex 17
urges every airport to maintain its own security service for safe-
guarding aircraft from unlawful access.'" The IATA has also sug-
gested measures similar to those contained in the annexes concerning
the guarding of tarmacs.151
E. The Effectiveness of Preventive Deterrence
Prevention is a necessary complement to punishment in the bat-
tle to eliminate attacks against flights in aviation. The number of
successful hijackings in the years after 1970 supports this conclusion.
The cooperation of states at the ICAO-sponsored conventions of the
early 1970'S152 was a likely cause for a decline in the number of
successful hijackings. While there were almost ninety hijackings in
1969 and 1970, the figure dropped into the sixties in both 1971 and
1972.'15 The figure then dropped into the twenties from 1973
through 1977.154 In 1973, the United States had begun its full pas-
senger-screening program and, in 1974, Annex 17 was adopted as
the authoritative aviation-security addition to the ICAO Convention.
Since 1978, the number of hijackings has remained at a relatively
stable rate of less than thirty-five per year. 155
146. See Palestinians Attacked Jet, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1985, at A3, col. I; Jordan Jet
in Athens Damaged by Bazooka, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1985, at A2, col. I.
147. FBI Holds Man in Shots at Planes, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1985, at B4, col. 1.
148. Beirut Hijackers Demand Departure of Palestinians, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1985,
at AI0, col. I.
149. ICAO Convention, Annex 14 (Aerodromes), §§ 8.4, 8.5, supra note 101.
150. ICAO Convention, Annex 17, § 4.2, supra note 100.
151. The IATA recommends that airports: (I) clearly mark areas of restricted access
"with signs and lockable or alarmed doors;" (2) establish gates or manned access controls "to
prevent entry of unauthorized persons to the airside of the airport;" and (3) adequately enclose
all public observation viewpoints that overlook the tarmac. IATA Recommended Procedures,
supra note 137.
152. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
153. EVANS & MURPHY, supra note 26, at 5.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 8; Making the Sky Secure. supra note 53, at 5.
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Although the frequency of attacks declined substantially after
the early 1970's, the problem re-emerged with an equivalent shock
value in 1985 due to a decrease in states' vigilance in adhering to
their national aviation security programs.156 The rules and regula-
tions for security programs are adequately defined in the security-
related annexes to the ICAO Convention, but their success depends
upon their implementation.157 States and air carriers must vigilantly
ensure that security personnel are effectively performing their du-
ties.1 58 One airline executive has said that "terrorists have demon-
strated that they will do what they want, when they want, no matter
what is done."1 59 The aviation industry must never succumb to this
defeatist attitude or else the terrorists will win by default.
IV. Enforcing the ICAO Convention
A. Development of the Security Program
The preamble to the 1944 ICAO Convention stated the con-
tracting states' intent to ensure that aviation "be developed in a safe
and orderly manner." 60 The ICAO began to develop a technical se-
curity program to deal with specific prevention - to be used on a
day-to-day basis - at an emergency session of the ICAO Assembly
in June 1970.161 At that session, the member nations adopted resolu-
tions regarding the need for security specifications and practices as
well as the need to assist each other in the implementation of secur-
ity measures.1 2 The ICAO Council and a team of aviation experts
responded to the resolutions by developing a Security Manual.16 3
The Security Manual, which is distributed to countries as a
classified document, provides guidance material and procedures on
all aspects of aviation security. 6 4 It was designed to assist states in
the implementation of their own national aviation security pro-
grams.1 65 The Manual suggests that security in each nation should
156. For a related view, see Kotaite, supra note 101, at 96.
157. See Terrorist Hijack Spurs U.S., supra note 59, at 32.
158. See Better Technology or Better Technicians?, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1985, at Al3,
col. 1.
159. Skrzycki, supra note 125, at 32.
160. ICAO Convention, supra note 10, preamble.
161. ICAO A-17 Res., 17th Sess. (Extraordinary), ICAO Doc. 8895 (June 16-30,
1970). See also Kotaite, supra note 101, at 98.
162. ICAO A-17 Res., 17th Sess. (Extraordinary), ICAO Doc. 8895 (June 16-30,
1970).
163. ICAO, Security Manual for the Prevention of Unlawful Acts Against Civil Avia-
tion, ICAO Doc. 8973 (Restricted) (1971). The Manual has since been revised and is now
titled "Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interfer-
ence." It is incorporated by reference into Annex 17. See ICAO Convention, Annex 17, Intro-
ductory Note to Ch.l, at 9, supra note 100; see also EVANS & MURPHY, supra note 26, at 27
(listing the states and organizations that assisted in developing the Manual).
164. Kotaite, supra note 101, at 97.
165. Id.
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be the responsibility of a national committee composed of represent-
atives from government agencies, airlines, airports, and aviation em-
ployees' organizations. 66
Security standards 1 7 and recommended practices6 8 were incor-
porated into several annexes to the ICAO Convention throughout the
early 1970's. Annex 17 specifically deals with administrative and or-
ganizational aspects of aviation security." 9 The basic goal of the
ICAO security program as set out in the annexes is to prevent un-
lawful access to aircraft. 70 The ICAO also attempts to assist states
in the implementation of their national security programs by or-
ganizing regional seminars and introducing courses on security at re-
gional aviation institutes.17 '
In response to the wave of attacks against aviation in mid-1985,
the ICAO drafted a model clause on aviation security for possible
insertion into existing bilateral air services agreements. 72 This
clause is a composite of the security-based clauses found in most
such agreements. It provides for the cooperation of parties in the
prevention and aftermath of attacks against flights in aviation. 73 In
addition, it could provide for sanctions against a party for any non-
compliance with the parties' security agreement. 74 The clause has
been submitted to the ICAO member states for comment. These
comments are expected to be incorporated into a final draft of the
clause by the Spring of 1986, at which time the ICAO Assembly will
vote on the final proposal.'7
166. EVANS & MURPHY, supra note 26, at 49.
167. A "standard" is defined as:
[a]ny specification for physical characteristics, configuration, matbriel, perform-
ance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as
necessary for the safety or regularity of international air navigation and to which
Contracting States will conform in accordance with the Convention; in the event
of impossibility of compliance, notification to the Council is compulsory under
Article 38.
ICAO Convention, Annex 17, foreword, sect. (l)(a), supra note 100, at 5, 6.
168. A "recommended practice" is defined as:
[a]ny specification for physical characteristics, configuration, materiel, perform-
ance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as
desirable in the interests of safety, regularity, or efficiency of international air
navigation, and to which Contracting States will endeavor to conform in accor-
dance with the Convention.
ICAO Convention, Annex 17, foreword, sect. (1)(a), supra note 100, at 6.
169. Kotaite, supra note 101, at 98.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 99.
172. See ICAO News Release No. 13-85, Sept. 1985, Report by the Secretary-General,
at 19 (available from Document Sales Unit, ICAO, Montreal, Quebec, Canada).
173. Id. at 5, 6.
174. Id.
175. Telephone interview with John Marrett, supra note 118.
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B. The Problem of Voluntary Compliance
Following the wave of attacks against aviation in June 1985,
one member of the United States House of Representatives' Foreign
Affairs Committee, during a discussion on the international laws
governing aviation security, succinctly stated that the ICAO's mea-
sures "are nothing; they're voluntary. 17 6 The congressman was al-
luding to the fact that most of the ICAO Convention's security mea-
sures are merely "recommended practices" which states are urged to
incorporate into their national regulations. 77 In addition to the rec-
ommended practices, there are several measures which are consid-
ered to be required as minimum "standards."178 However, Article 38
to the ICAO Convention allows a state to observe lower standards,
conditional upon notification of the ICAO, if that state "finds it im-
practicable to comply in all respects with any such international
standard or procedure. 1 79
Hijacking and terrorism had not been foreseen when the ICAO
Convention was first drafted in 1944.180 The structure of the ICAO
focuses on the facilitation of aviation and not upon the urgency of
increasing preventive measures restricting aviation. 1 ' ICAO officials
admit that the ICAO has no penal authority.'82 The ICAO has es-
tablished relevant international guidelines for security measures but,
due to the sovereignty of nations, adherence to the standards and
recommended practices depends upon the willingness of individual
countries to comply. 8 '
C. Sanctions Against States That Fail to Prevent Attacks
On several occasions during the seven months prior to the June
1985 hijacking of the American aircraft from the Athens airport,
international inspection teams attempted to contact high-level offi-
cials in Greece in order to advise the latter that they found several
security deficiencies in that airport. The inspection teams addition-
ally offered technical assistance to Greece to correct the situation.'"
The inspectors were unsuccessful in convincing the Greek authorities
176. Hill Considers Ways to Boost Airport Security, 43 CONG. Q. & WEEKLY REP., at
1252, 1253, June 29, 1985 (statement of Rep. Mica).
177. See supra note 168.
178. See supra note 167.
179. ICAO Convention, supra note 10, at art. 38.
180. N.Y. Times, supra note 38 (statement of A. Kotaite).
181. See generally ICAO, Report of the Technical Comm'n, Assembly, 21st Sess., Sept.
24-Oct. 15, 1974, Res. A21-23 (1975); ICAO, Report of the Eighth Air Navigation Confer-
ence, Apr. 17-May I1, 1974, at 10, Doc. 9101, AN/CONF/8.
182. Terrorist Hijack Spurs U.S., supra note 59, at 32.
183. See id; see also EVANS & MURPHY, supra note 26, at 7 (concerning the preference
of ICAO to assume passive stance on the issue of sanctions).
184. See Terrorist Hijack Spurs U.S., supra note 59, at 32; Skrzycki, supra note 125,
at 31.
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that corrections needed to be made.8 5 Even after the June hijacking,
the Greek Government resented accusations that its airport security
had been lax. It instinctively took a defensive political position and
refused to accept immediate assistance to improve security."8 6
Whether such a government attitude violates the Annex 17 rec-
ommendation that each "Contracting State should co-operate with
other States, particularly with . . . those with which it has major air
transport relationships, in developing complementary civil aviation
security programmes" is questionable. 1 7 In retaliation for the per-
ceived apathy of the Greek Government, the United States issued a
travel advisory warning Americans that "there was an above-average
potential danger of terrorist acts aboard flights departing from the
airport in Athens, Greece due to lax security at that airport."188 The
travel advisory significantly hurt the tourist industry in Greece as
potential summer vacationers cancelled plans to travel there. Several
American air carriers also suspended flights to the Athens airport.18 9
After criticizing the United States initially, the Greek Govern-
ment began to improve its airport security with respect to the screen-
ing of passengers, baggage and airport personnel. In addition, the
Government began construction of a new fence around the airport. 190
As a result of these improvements, the United States revoked its
travel advisory five weeks after its issuance. 91
The success of the travel advisory as a unilateral sanction
prompted the United States Government to pass legislation in Au-
gust 1985.192 This legislation officially authorized the executive
branch to issue such an advisory whenever a country, after ninety
days' notice, fails to improve airport security to a level equivalent to,
"at a minimum, the standards and appropriate recommended prac-
tices contained in Annex 17 to the [ICAO Convention].' 193 In addi-
tion, if the Secretary of State finds that a nation has permitted a
"high terrorist threat" to exist, the President of the United States
185. Skrzycki, supra note 125, at 31.
186. See Greeks Claim Athens Needs No Security Upgrade, supra note 104, at 30. The
United States Department of State had offered to Greece funds for equipment, training and
counseling in security measures, in conjunction with the State Department's Anti-Terrorist
Training Program, but Greece rejected the offer. See Terrorist Hijack Spurs U.S., supra note
59, at 32.
187. ICAO Convention, Annex 17, para. 3.1.1, supra note 100, at 11.
188. Reagan, Hill Find Options Few in Response to Terrorist Acts, 43 CONG. Q. &
WEEKLY REP., 1200, 1201, June 21, 1985.
189. See Greece Urges American to Ignore President's Travel Warning, N.Y. Times,
July 22, 1985, at A9, col. 1.
190. See U.S., After Check. Says Athens Airport Is Safe, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1985, at
A3, col. I.
191. Id.
192. 1985 Act, 99 Stat. 190 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. §§
193. Id. at § 551(a), 99 Stat. 190, 222-225 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1356b); see
also id. § 552(a), 99 Stat. 190, 226 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1515a).
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may then suspend foreign assistance to that nation. 94 Although the
issuance of a travel advisory has proven to be an effective means of
enforcing the aviation-security provisions of the ICAO Convention,
several points should be made concerning its usage.
Advisories, boycotts, and similar sanctions which are intended
to be only temporary cannot justifiably last forever because each
country represents a valuable and necessary link in any fully-com-
prehensive aviation network. Such sanctions, if indiscriminately is-
sued, could have major repercussions on all forms of commercial re-
lations between nations, not just on the air commerce industry.
Furthermore, one nation's suspension of commercial air relations
with another could detrimentally affect the aviation industry of a
third nation. By forcing nationals of the target nation onto the air-
craft of a third nation, the risk of a potential terrorist attack would
also be transferred to the carriers of that third nation. 195 Therefore,
the use of sanctions could foreseeably affect other states.
Another reason why the use of sanctions as a means of publiciz-
ing inadequate airport security within a state could be risky is that
such criticism would be the equivalent of issuing an international
airport guide to potential terrorist hijackers and saboteurs.1' 6 How-
ever, as the 1985 wave of attacks against aviation has shown, ter-
rorists probably have their own means of gaining intelligence con-
cerning the most vulnerable aircraft and airports. Nevertheless, the
American legislators who passed the August 1985 sanction provi-
sions agreed that such provisions "should be closely monitored in
[their] implementation"'17 to prevent the dissemination of informa-
tion that would otherwise be unavailable.
V. Conclusion
Although the understandings among states as to their legal re-
sponsibilities to punish aircraft hijackers and saboteurs have been
made clear, there remains a challenge, more urgent than ever, for
governments to work together to effectively prevent such hijackings
and sabotage before they occur. 9 8 Links between terrorist groups in
different nations clearly demonstrate the need for the governments
and security services of all civilized nations to work together against
194. 1985 Act § 552(b), 99 Stat. 190, 226 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 note, 22
U.S.C. § 2751 note). Also, the 1985 Act recommends that the President take steps to achieve
a total aviation boycott with respect to those states which the President determines to be sup-
porters of terrorism. Id. § 555, 99 Stat. 190, 227.
195. See Terrorist Hijack Spurs U.S., supra note 59, at 31.
196. See id.
197. H.R. REP. No. 237, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 127 (1985).
198. See DOT Press Release No. 67-85, supra note 7.
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such people.199 Despite the innovation of the most sophisticated tech-
nology in both aviation security and aviation in general, any lack of
adequate supervision of security personnel may be exploited by ter-
rorists. The catastrophic losses of lives and aircraft, as evidenced by
the results of attacks against aviation in 1985 alone, are both inex-
cusable and avoidable. As an example, Israel has not had one of its
aircraft successfully hijacked since it developed its security program
in 1968.200 During the summer of 1985, Israel attributed an in-
creased amount of bookings aboard its national air carrier, in part,
to its thorough security program. 20 1
It is necessary that governments cooperate to punish terrorists
who are apprehended for hijacking, sabotaging, or otherwise unlaw-
fully attacking aircraft or airline patrons. However, it is equally im-
portant that states not rely on punishment and other ex post facto
deterrents if they wish to significantly curtail the number of such
attacks. Constant vigilance, inspection, and maintenance of national
security programs, when combined with the threat of sanctions from
other states to punish lapses in national vigilance, could go a long
way toward eliminating the terrorist threat to aviation.
David L. Glassman
199. See Thatcher Urges the Press to Help 'Starve' Terrorists, N.Y. Times, July 16,
1985, at A3, col. 5.
200. See Trimble, supra note 144; LOWENFELD, supra note 25, § 2.31, at 8-44.
201. See Trips to Athens Are Being Canceled, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1985, at A18, col.
I. In evaluating the impressive record of Israel's national air carrier, however, it is important
to remember (I) the small size of Israel and (2) the necessity for its investment in a compre-
hensive security program due to the number of terrorist groups opposed to Israel.
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